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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has found itself under a subtle, non-violent attack 
by a rival foreign government.  An unprecedented, sustained, and multi-
pronged campaign of activity that does not constitute traditional 
military force or espionage threatens to exert a stealthy and non-
attributable influence upon American attitudes toward international 
affairs at a moment of global crisis.  Our adversary seeks to expand its 
geographical control and its worldwide influence at the expense of 
liberal democratic powers.  Institutions at the very core of American 
democracy–the news media, lawfully assembled labor and advocacy 
organizations, and corporations–are at risk of becoming unwitting tools 
of this assault. 
The adversary similarly seeks to acquire American scientific and 
technical expertise and to use its economic power to affect American 
and Western European supply chains.  It does so through agents and co-
optees who endeavor to procure intellectual property and supplies 
without revealing the adversary’s involvement. 
The year is 1915.  The adversary that has so effectively identified 
modes of attack that exploit the inherent openness of democracy and 
free-market capitalism is Imperial Germany.  The United States has 
detected the German influence campaign.  No law exists, however, to 
support the investigation and disruption of foreign-directed activity 
that, if successful, could keep the United States out of the Great War and 
hand victory in Europe to the rising German Empire. 
In the twenty-first century, the United States similarly confronts a 
powerful influence campaign directed by the Russian Federation, which 
similarly seeks to expand its geographical control and global influence 
to the detriment of democratic nations.  The People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) presents a different threat that also finds precedent in pre-war 
German activity:  acquisition of American scientific and technical 
knowledge and material.  A critical difference today, rooted in the 
American response to the German campaign a century ago, is the 
availability of instruments of U.S. criminal law that can deter, punish, 
and—perhaps most essentially—reveal foreign efforts to subvert 
American democracy.  This Article discusses one of those tools, which 
dates back to the 1917 enactment of the Espionage Act:  Title 18, United 
States Code, Section 951 (“Section 951”).1  Current and emerging threats 
 
 1 Section 951 covers a broader range of activities than the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act (“FARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 611 et	seq., and is less widely understood.  FARA 
and Section 951 are often confused with each other, or erroneously used 
interchangeably.  Although they have overlapping purposes,  
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to U.S. national security bear striking similarities to the pre-World War 
I challenges to American socio-political, economic, and technological 
leadership and independence.  Accordingly, the origin and development 
of Section 951 indicate how the statute may be used to counter twenty-
first century threats.  Moreover, as noted below, the U.S. Senate has both 
recognized the “non-traditional” intelligence threat that Russia and 
China present and indicated an intent to review and update Section 951 
and FARA.  The background set forth herein provides a foundation for 
discussion of potential application of the statute and forthcoming 
proposals to modify it.   
This Article examines the scope of conduct that can predicate 
charges of acting as an agent of a foreign government under Section 951, 
and explains how the statute has been applied over time to combat 
foreign governments’ clandestine activities that fall outside of “classic” 
espionage and sabotage efforts.  That history provides a view into the 
future application of the statute to current and emerging threats.  It is 
critical for practitioners and potential defendants to appreciate that 
conduct that is otherwise non-criminal, or that would otherwise violate 
statutes with less significant sentencing exposure, may violate an 
important national security statute if undertaken in the United States 
secretly on behalf of a foreign government. 
Part II provides historical context for the statute.  Part III 
summarizes how courts and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have 
interpreted the scope of conduct that Section 951 proscribes, based on 
judicial opinions and DOJ charging decisions.  Part IV describes more 
recent use of Section 951.  Part V discusses how Section 951 can be used 
in the future to counter continuing and evolving national security 
threats that rely on misattribution, such as influence operations and 
misappropriation of American research and intellectual property.  
Bearing in mind that Section 951 punishes conduct engaged in as an 
agent of a foreign government, and not a defendant’s mere status as such 
 
FARA is designed to encourage transparency by foreign principals 
attempting to influence the U.S. government or public through public 
speech, political activities, and lobbying through agents in the United 
States, not to discourage that conduct itself, [while] Section 951 . . . is used 
to prosecute clandestine, espionage-like behavior, information gathering, 
and procurement of technology on behalf of foreign governments or 
officials. Although Section 951 requires notification to the Attorney 
General, the statute is designed to deter and punish wrongful conduct 
(namely, engaging in clandestine conduct on behalf of a foreign power).  
Oversight	of	the	Foreign	Agents	Registration	Act	and	Attempts	to	Influence	U.S.	Elections:		
Lessons	Learned	from	Current	and	Prior	Administrations, U.S. Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary 
2 (2017) (statement of Adam S. Hickey, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice).  
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an agent, the scope of conduct Section 951 can cover is as broad as the 
plain language of the statute.  As cases emerge involving “non-
traditional collectors,”2 such as “researchers in labs, universities, and 
the defense industrial base”3 who operate at the direction of foreign 
governments, the century-old Section 951 can under certain 
circumstances potentially be used to expose, deter, and punish such 
actors’ conduct. 
II. BACKGROUND 
As described below, the origins of Section 951 trace directly to the 
emergence of the United States as a global power just over one hundred 
years ago.  European powers engaged in the First World War sought to 
influence the United States, obtain the benefits of American technology, 
industry, and commerce, and disrupt activities in the United States that 
could aid their adversaries. 
A.	Statutory	Text	
Section 951 provides that: 
 
(a) Whoever, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or 
attaché, acts in the United States as an agent of a foreign 
government without prior notification to the Attorney 
General if required in subsection (b), shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 
 
A “foreign government” includes “any government, faction, or body 
of insurgents within a country with which the United States is at peace, 
irrespective of recognition by the United States.”4  An “agent of a foreign 
government” is defined as “an individual who agrees to operate within 
the United States subject to the direction or control of a foreign 
government or official,” and excludes accredited diplomatic and 
 
 2 Non-traditional collectors use “non-traditional methods—both lawful and 
unlawful—blending things like foreign investments and corporate acquisitions with 
things like cyber intrusions and espionage by corporate insiders.”  Christopher Wray, 
Responding	Effectively	to	the	Chinese	Economic	Espionage	Threat, Department of Justice 
China Initiative Conference, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Jan. 6, 2020) 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/responding-effectively-to-the-chinese-
economic-espionage-threat. 
	 3	 China’s	 Non‐Traditional	 Espionage	 Against	 the	 United	 States:	 The	 Threat	 and	
Potential	Policy	Responses, U.S. Sen Comm. on the Judiciary 8 (2018) (statement of John 
C. Demers, Assistant Att’y Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).  
 4 18 U.S.C. § 11.   
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consular officers, officially and publicly acknowledged and sponsored 
representatives of foreign governments, and their non-U.S. citizen staff.5 
The definition also excludes individuals engaged solely in legal 
commercial transactions.6  A “legal commercial transaction” is “any 
exchange, transfer, purchase or sale, of any commodity, service or 
property of any kind, including information or intellectual property, not 
prohibited by federal or state legislation or implementing regulations.”7  
By its terms, Section 951 imposes criminal liability for an 
individual’s actions, not his or her nationality, status, or employer.  
Moreover, it applies to acts undertaken “in the United States.”8  A 
defendant’s agreement to act under the direction or control of a foreign 
government, and his or her undertaking actions within the United States 
under such direction or control, are key elements of the crime.9  The 
scope of conduct and agency relationship that Section 951 covers are 
discussed below in the context of the statute’s enactment and 
amendment.   
B.	Context	and	Legislative	History	
German activities preceding the United States’ entry into the First 
World War gave rise to Section 951’s predecessor.  The statute has since 
been amended to modify its scope and to transfer responsibility for 
notification from the State Department to DOJ.10 
1. Before U.S. Entry into the First World War 
When the First World War broke out in Europe, the United States 
had “substantially no law on the statute books affecting the conduct of 
the individual except the Treason Statute, which proved well-nigh 
useless, and the Internment Statute, which affected only alien 
 
 5 18 U.S.C. § 951(d)(1)-(3).  The Attorney General is required to promulgate 
regulations establishing notification requirements, and to transmit notifications to the 
Secretary of State.  18 U.S.C. § 951(b), (c).  Regulations implementing Section 951 and 
providing definitions of terms are set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 73.1-6. 
 6 18 U.S.C. § 951(d)(4).   
 7 28 C.F.R. § 73.1(f).  An individual can be prosecuted under Section 951 for legal 
commercial transactions if the individual engaging in them is an agent of Cuba or any 
other country the President determines is a threat to the national security interest of the 
United States, or if the individual has been convicted of espionage- or export control-
related crimes.  18 U.S.C. § 951(e)(1)-(2)(a);	see 28 C.F.R. § 73.2(a). 
 8 18 U.S.C. § 951(a). 
 9 For the technical requirements for notification, see	28 C.F.R. § 73.3.  As a practical 
matter, there are no reported cases in which a defendant claimed that he or she had, in 
fact, notified the Attorney General of his or her prospective activities as an agent of a 
foreign government. 
	 10	 Infra	Part II(B)(4). 
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enemies.”11  The United States lacked sufficient “war statutes.”  
“[A]lmost no protection against hostile activities” existed, the law 
offered “inadequate protection against the activity of hostile 
propagandists,” and “the few statutes aimed to prevent breaches of 
neutrality were most inadequate.”12  The United States was so 
unprepared to defend itself against espionage and similar threats that 
no federal agency even bore an explicit counterespionage mission.13 
The United States remained neutral when the war started in 1914, 
but Europe persistently tested that neutrality.  As the Great Powers vied 
for influence throughout the world, Germany sought to pierce the arms 
embargo that the United States had imposed on Mexico while Mexico 
was in a state of civil war.14  German efforts to form alliances with 
Mexico and instigate conflict between Mexico and the United States 
persisted, including clandestine meetings within the United States.15  
Moreover, despite the neutral status of the United States, the 
combination of British control of sea commerce and continued 
American overseas trade and investment provided a substantial benefit 
to the Entente powers allied against Germany and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire.16 
 
 11 John Lord O’Brian, Civil	Liberty	in	War	Time, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Procs. of the 42nd 
Ann. Mtg. 275, 277 (1919).  John Lord O’Brian served as head of the Department of 
Justice War Emergency Division from 1917 to 1919.  Addressing the New York State Bar 
Association after the war, he observed with pride that “[n]o other nation came through 
the struggle with so little disorder and with so little interference with the civil liberty of 
the individual” and noted that it “was the view of the department . . . that there should 
be no repression of political agitation unless of a character directly affecting the safety 
of the state.” Id. at 276-77. 
	 12	 Id. at 278-79. 
 13 MICHAEL J. SULICK, SPYING IN AMERICA:  ESPIONAGE FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE 
DAWN OF THE COLD WAR 111 (2012); see Brewing	and	Liquor	 Interests	and	German	and	
Bolshevik	 Propaganda:	 Report	 and	 Hearings	 S.	 Res.	 307	 and	 S.	 Res.	 436	 Before	 the	
Subcommittee	on	the	Judiciary, 65th Cong.	1388 (1919) (Testimony of A. Bruce Bielaski, 
Department of Justice Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter Bielaski Senate Testimony].  
DOJ’s Bureau of Investigation was the forerunner of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI). 
 14 This led to low-level armed conflict.  In 1914, the United States invaded Veracruz, 
Mexico in response to a German attempt to ship arms to the Mexican government.  
BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM:  AMERICA ENTERS THE WAR, 1917-1918, at 
43 (2014).  A United States Navy vessel blocked a German ship from reaching port, and 
armed conflict between American and Mexican forces resulted in casualties on both 
sides.  Id. at 46-47. 
 15 TUCHMAN,	supra	note 14, at 62-64, 73-74, 83. 
 16 JUSTUS D. DOENECKE, NOTHING LESS THAN WAR:  A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICA’S ENTRY INTO 
WORLD WAR I 53-57, 64-65, 90-91, 125, 187 (2014); ARTHUR S. LINK, WILSON: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR NEUTRALITY, 1914-1915, at 105 (1960); SULICK, supra note 13, at 112; HOWARD ZINN, A 
PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1492-PRESENT 362 (1999); see	also Letter from 
Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, German Ambassador, to Robert Lansing, Secretary of 
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Germany targeted transatlantic shipping with U-Boat strikes to 
mitigate the benefit that the United Kingdom enjoyed from trade with 
the United States.17  Tensions between the United States and the 
belligerent powers increased, and after the German Navy sank the 
Lusitania on May 7, 1915, President Woodrow Wilson tasked the Secret 
Service with monitoring German diplomatic activities in America.18 
American, British, and Mexican operatives identified several 
clandestine German lines of effort within the United States.19  As a Secret 
Service counterintelligence success revealed, one such effort involved a 
network in the United States established to conduct sabotage operations 
as well as to use economic and social manipulation to advance German 
war objectives.20   
Dr. Heinrich Albert, the German commercial attaché, handled the 
network’s finances.21  One day in July 1915, Albert boarded a New York 
City subway, accompanied by the editor of Fatherland, a pro-German 
newspaper.22  After the editor’s stop, Albert fell asleep, awoke abruptly 
at his own stop, and rushed off the train.23  A Secret Service agent who 
had been following Albert observed that Albert left his briefcase behind 
in his haste.24  The agent recovered the briefcase, which was found to 
contain documents describing “a sweeping secret campaign, linked to 
 
State (Aug. 18, 1915), in	Foreign Relations 1915 Supp., 928 (Dep’t of State, Office of  the 
Historian, 1928) [hereinafter Bernstorff Aug. 18 Letter]. 
 17 SULICK, supra note 13, at 112; DOENECKE, supra note 16, at 60-64; Michael Warner, 
The	 Kaiser	 Sows	 Destruction, Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of 
Intelligence (June 27, 2008), available	at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no1/article02.html. 
 18 TUCHMAN, supra	note 14, at 71; SULICK, supra note 13, at 112; LINK, supra note 16, 
at 554; U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV., WORLD WAR I CENTENNTIAL COMMEMORATIVE POSTER 
SERVICES: THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR (2017). 
	 19	 See,	e.g., TUCHMAN, supra	note 14, at 67-79; Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	note 
13, at 1388-92, 1431-34, 1445-46 (describing examples of German plots). 
 20 SULICK, supra note 13, at 113.   
 21 SULICK, supra note 13, at 114-15; 3	Noted	Germans	Interned	For	War	In	Hunt	For	
Spies, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1917, at 1; Albert	Defends	His	Propaganda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 
1915, at 7; Government	 Agents	 Probe	 Charge	 of	 $2,000,000‐A‐Week	 Propaganda	 By	
Germans, THE EVENING WORLD, Aug. 16, 1915, at 3; Attaches	‘Objectionable,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
4, 1915, at 1. 
 22 TUCHMAN, supra	note 14, at 78. 
 23 TUCHMAN, supra	note 14, at 78. 
 24 TUCHMAN	supra	note 14, at 81; SULICK, supra note 13, at 114-15.  Although cynics 
might assume that U.S. agents may have been more proactive in acquiring the briefcase, 
Albert placed an advertisement in the newspaper seeking the return of his “lost” 
briefcase.  See	SULICK, supra note 13, at 113 (quoting advertisement in The	New	York	
Evening	Telegram July 27, 1915); Ernest Wittenberg, The	Thrifty	Spy	on	the	Sixth	Avenue	
El, AMERICAN HERITAGE (Dec. 1965), https://www.americanheritage.com/thrifty-spy-
sixth-avenue-el. 
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high-ranking German officials, of espionage, sabotage, and 
propaganda.”25  
Government officials provided the contents of the briefcase to 
President Wilson and shared them with the New	York	World.  News 
media outlets published the documents with analysis.26  Meanwhile, 
British intelligence officers intercepted John J. Archibald, an American 
newspaper reporter who was carrying correspondence from German 
and Austro-Hungarian officials in the United States to recipients in their 
respective countries.27  That  correspondence—some of which was 
made public and some of which the U.S. Government initially kept 
confidential after the British provided it—corroborated serious 
allegations of German violations of American neutrality and clandestine 
interference in American political, social, and economic affairs.28  The 
German government conducted this campaign using commercial 
transactions and other interactions that concealed German 
participation. 
The German plans included not only schemes for sabotage and 
potential attacks on the United States, but also efforts to conduct 
influence operations, prevent the supply of war materiel to the Allies, 
and obtain technology and supplies for Germany. These latter types of 
activity did not violate any then-existing criminal law.  For example, 
German agents established the “German Information Bureau” in New 
 
 25 David Greenberg, The	Hidden	History	of	the	Espionage	Act, SLATE, Dec. 27, 2010, 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/12/the-real-purpose-of-the-espionage-
act.html; see	 also O’Brian,	 supra	 note 11, at 284 (referring to secret German plans 
including the recruitment of U.S. citizens to engage in espionage); LINK, supra note 16, at 
554-55; SULICK, supra note 13, at 115. 
 26 LINK, supra note 16, at 555 & n.8; TUCHMAN, supra	note 14, at 78-79; DOENECKE, 
supra note 16, at 114; Lansing	 Lays	 German	 Propaganda	 Evidence	 Before	 President	
Wilson, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1915, at 1-2 (citing reports that DOJ possessed “a mass of 
information tending to show that German agents had been working in this country with 
a view to helping the cause of the Teutonic allies” and including three pages describing 
various German plots); How	Germany	has	Worked	 in	U.S.	 to	Shape	Opinion,	Block	 the	
Allies,	and	Get	Munitions	for	Herself,	Told	in	Secret	Agents’	Letters, N.Y. WORLD, Aug. 15, 
1915; see	 also,	 e.g., ROSS J. WILSON, NEW YORK AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR:  SHAPING AN 
AMERICAN CITY 110 (2014) (describing publication by the World of documents detailing 
German efforts). 
 27 TUCHMAN, supra note 14, at 79-80, 83; Germans	Sought	Aircraft	Control,	Bielaski	
Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1918, at 1, 3; Plot	to	Tie	Up	U.S.	Munitions	Plants	Told	In	Alleged	
Letter	of	Austrian	Envoy	Seized	From	Capt.	Archibald, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1915, at 1; 
Bielaski Senate Testimony at 1463-84. 
 28 Letter from The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Secretary of State (Sep. 3, 
1915) reprinted	 in Foreign Relations 1915 Supp. at 936, available at 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1915Supp/d773; see	  TUCHMAN, 
supra	note 14, at 82, 85; Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	note 13, at 1468-84. 
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York to circulate pro-German news stories.29  The Bureau was not 
publicly linked to the German government.30 Among other tactics, the 
Bureau operated at least one high-profile American journalist as an 
agent and planted him in the Hearst media organization as a Berlin 
correspondent.31  To the public, the Bureau appeared to be run by an 
American.32 
In the spring of 1915, “a syndicate of German American 
businessmen backed by Berlin” bought the New	York	Evening	Mail.33  
This purchase was organized by the German Information Bureau 
leadership.34  The group purchased the newspaper through an 
intermediary to obfuscate its true ownership.35  This purchase was part 
of a German effort to control American English-language newspapers to 
foster anti-war sentiment.  As A. Bruce Bielaski, Chief of the DOJ Bureau 
of Investigation, stated unequivocally to the United States Senate, “it was 
the purchase by the German Government of a daily newspaper for the 
purpose of influencing American public opinion.”36  Nominal American 
ownership concealed German involvement. 
 
	 29	 Brewing	and	Liquor	Interests	and	German	and	Bolshevik	Propaganda:	Report	of	the	
Subcomm.	 On	 the	 Judiciary, Pursuant	 to	 S.	 Res.	 307	 and	 436, 65th Cong. 13 (1919) 
[hereinafter Overman Report] (referring to organization also as “German Information 
Service”); Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	note 13, at 1389, 1445. 
 30 Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	note 13, at 1389. 
 31 Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	note 13, at 1393-94. 
 32 Overman Report, supra note 29, at 13-14 (“[I]n the early stages of the bureau’s 
operation publicity was given to the fact that the bureau was ‘conducted by [a known 
publicity agent],’ at the request of a number of American citizens . . . .  That, of course, 
was done to deceive the public, because the bureau was organized, financed, and 
directed by the official representatives of Germany.”); Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	
note 13, at 1389-95 (same; adding that the second head of the Bureau, an American 
journalist, was a “secret agent of the German Government”); see REIHNARD R. DOERRIES, 
IMPERIAL CHALLENGE, AMBASSADOR COUNT BERNSTORFF AND GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 
1908-1917 41 n.11, 43 (Christa D. Shannon trans., The University of Carolina Press) 
(1989).  The German Ambassador acknowledged German control of the Bureau and did 
not address the concealment of official German control. Bernstorff Aug. 18 Letter, supra 
note 16, at 930-31. 
 33 DOENECKE, supra note 16, at 113; see U.S.	Looks	Into	Spy	Propaganda, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 16, 1915, at 1, 3; Letter from William Gibbs McAdoo to President Woodrow Wilson 
(annotated) (July 9, 1917), in THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, DIGITAL EDITION 133 & n.2 
(University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2017); see Rumely v. United States, 293 F. 532, 
536 (2d Cir. 1923). 
 34 Overman Report, supra note 29, at 13. 
 35 DOENECKE, supra note 16, at 113; DOERRIES, supra note 32, at 54; see	Rumely, 293 F. 
at 536; Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	note 13, at 1454. 
 36 Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	note 13, at 1455; see	Government	Agents	Probe	
Charge	of	$2,000,000‐A‐Week	Propaganda	By	Germans, supra	note 21; Millions	for	Plots:	
Von	Bernstorff	Used	Vast	Sum	to	Corrupt	Public	Opinion, WASH. POST, July 18, 1918, at 5; 
DOERRIES, supra note 32, at 53 & n.78 (quoting the German Ambassador to the United 
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That effort also contemplated controlling the American Press 
Association, which would give Germany, through Albert, control over a 
wire service “to spread pro-German news or to suppress anti-German 
news or to make pro-German propaganda in any other way compatible 
with the organization.”37 
Other newspapers, most notably Fatherland, received substantial 
covert funding from Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  
Fatherland was a reliable mouthpiece for pro-German sentiment about 
the war and America’s potential entry on behalf of one side or another.38  
The Albert papers revealed that “the German Government [was] the 
financial backer” of the newspaper, and that Fatherland received “a 
monthly bonus” from Albert.39  When the German Ambassador 
responded to the public disclosure, he did not deny the German attempt 
to control the newspaper’s message—rather, he merely (falsely) 
claimed that the effort failed.40  Of particular note, Germany paid 
Fatherland through an intermediary and sought editorial control of the 
content the newspaper printed.41  Despite the Fatherland editor’s public 
denials in 1915, his correspondence to Albert suggested that Germany 
pay the newspaper through a specific attorney, “whose standing as [the 
editor’s] legal advisor would exempt him from any possible inquiry.”42  
The editor later admitted to receiving substantial funds from Germany 
and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.43   
Germany also used clandestine operations to influence American 
labor and peace movements both to sway public opinion against siding 
with the Allies (including appeals based on ethnicity and nationality) 
and to disrupt war-related supply chains.44  Further seeking to interrupt 
American sales of munitions and equipment to the Allies, Germany used 
 
States as writing, “I consider it urgently necessary for the future . . . to bring an English-
language newspaper under our control.”). 
 37 Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	note 13, at 1502-03, Ex. 97. 
	 38	 See	DOENECKE, supra note 16, at 21, 26, 60, 120; TUCHMAN, supra	note 14, at 164. 
	 39	 Government	Agents	Probe	Charge	of	$2,000,000‐A‐Week	Propaganda	By	Germans, 
supra	note 21; see	also	U.S.	Looks	Into	Spy	Propaganda, supra	note 33, at 3. 
 40 Bernstorff Aug. 18 Letter, supra note 16, at 930. 
	 41	 U.S.	Looks	Into	Spy	Propaganda, supra	note 33; Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	
note 13, at 1430 (citing correspondence); Wittenberg, supra note 24. 
	 42	 U.S.	Looks	into	Spy	Propaganda,	supra note 33, at 3.  
	 43	 Vireck	Got	$100,000	 from	the	Germans, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1918, at 20; Bielaski 
Senate Testimony, supra	note 13, at 1432. 
 44 Greenberg, supra note 25; Germans	Sought	Aircraft	Control, supra	note 27, at 1, 3; 
Gompers	 Confirms	 Foreign	 Tampering, N.Y. TIMES,	 Aug. 18, 1915 at 5;	 May	 Involve	
Embassy	Men, N.Y. TIMES Aug. 17, 1915, at 1, 2; U.S.	Looks	into	Spy	Propaganda,	supra note 
33;	Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	note 13, at 1468. 
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non-attributable means to acquire supplies and intellectual property for 
the sole purpose of preventing their export. 
For example, German agents established the Bridgeport Projectile 
Company in Connecticut.  As noted above, the British Navy dominated 
the Atlantic, and there was little likelihood that Germany could supply 
itself by manufacturing munitions in the United States and then shipping 
them to Europe.45  Rather, the Germans established the company simply 
to purchase massive quantities of supplies, such as gunpowder and shell 
casings, and to store those materials to prevent the Allies from 
purchasing them.46  The company would take orders from Allied forces 
with the intent not to fulfill them.47  When American newspapers 
published information about this scheme, German officials admitted and 
justified their efforts to prevent their enemies from acquiring war 
materiel.48  The German establishment of a business on American soil, 
its contracts with American companies, its removal of raw materials 
from the U.S. marketplace, and its false promises to deliver on U.S. sales 
to Allied powers, however, had all masqueraded behind notional 
American ownership.49   
 
	 45	 See	DOENECKE, supra note 16, at 64; Gompers	Confirms	Foreign	Tampering,	supra 
note 44. 
	 46	 Government	Agents	Probe	Charge	of	$2,000,000‐A‐Week	Propaganda	By	Germans, 
supra	note 21 (“There also is proof that the German Government is building a large 
munitions plant in this country for shrapnel and other explosives, and that it has a 
contract for the entire output of powder of one explosives company.  This German 
company is now negotiating to supply the British and Russian Governments with its 
product, but without any real purpose to deliver the goods.”); Idiotic	Yankees	Told	to	
Hold	Their	Tongues,	Von	Papen	Writes	Wife, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1915, at 3; Say	Arms	
Plant	Controlled	by	Germany	Sought	U.S.	Army	Officers	to	Inspect	Output, WASH. POST, Aug. 
17, 1915, at 2; Wittenberg,	 supra note 24; see Eric Setzekorn, The	 Office	 of	 Naval	
Intelligence	in	World	War	I:	Diverse	Threats,	Divergent	Responses, Studies in Intelligence 
Vol. 61, No. 2 (June 2017), at 45, available	at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-
the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-61-no-2/pdfs/oni-
in-ww1.pdf. 
 47 Letter from Franz von Papen, German Military Attaché, the German Ministry of 
War (Aug. 20, 1915) reprinted	in	Foreign Relations 1915 Supp., 939-40 (Dep’t of State, 
Office of the Historian, 1928) [hereinafter Von Papen Aug. 20 Letter]; Gompers	Confirms	
Foreign	Tampering, supra note 44; Germany	Hid	Secret	Plans	To	Get	War	Supplies	Here, 
N.Y. EVENING WORLD, Aug. 17, 1915, at 4, available	 at	
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83030193/1915-08-17/ed-1/seq-3/.  
	 48	 Albert	Defends	His	Propaganda, N.Y. TIMES,	Aug. 20, 1915, at 7; Bernstorff Aug. 18 
Letter,	supra note 16, at 928 (“If we had the means and the opportunity we would buy 
every munition factory in the United States, if in that way we could keep munitions from 
the enemy . . . .”).  
	 49	 See	generally	Wittenberg, supra note 24; Germany	Controls	Only	U.S.	Source	From	
Which	Powder	Can	Be	Had	This	Year, supra note 46 (“References in the contract indicate 
the desire of both parties to prevent the identity of actual control from being known . . . 
.”); Ties	Up	Only	Machinery	Adapted	to	Making	of	Better	Class	of	Shrapnel, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 17, 1915, at 2; Gompers	Confirms	Foreign	Tampering, supra note 44.  The Archibald 
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Germany sought to control not only materials and facilities needed 
to manufacture war supplies, but also intellectual property that could 
provide a critical advantage in an emerging military technology—
specifically, the airplane.  In July 1915, the German consul in Chicago 
wrote to Albert regarding a German plan for the  
purchase of the Wright aeroplane factories in Dayton, Ohio, 
which, in my opinion, hold great possibilities for us.  With 
some $50,000 we could acquire a control over the whole 
Wright patents, and thereby over the aeroplane factories in 
the whole United States, for about one year.  We would 
thereby probably be placed in the position of being able to 
prevent the greatest part of the export of flying machines from 
the United States.50 
The Albert and Archibald papers, which the news media published, 
provided evidence of this plot.51  It is unclear how far the plot 
progressed, but the consul proposed conducting the deal between a 
 
papers’ corroboration of this scheme was disclosed to the public.  Plot	 to	Tie	Up	U.S.	
Munition	Plants	Told	 In	Alleged	Letter	Of	Austrian	Envoy	Seized	From	Capt.	Archibald, 
WASH. POST,	Sept. 5, 1915 at 1-2 (citing New	York	World	reporting and reprinting of von 
Papen correspondence); Germany	Hid	Secret	Plans	To	Get	War	Supplies	Here, supra note 
47 (“American officers are supposed to control the company. . . .”); DOERRIES, supra note 
32, at 141 & n.5 (“Papen and Albert bought up war materials through firms such as the 
Bridgeport Projectile Company and the Aetna Powder Company, which had been 
founded particularly for this purpose by straw men, in order to delay shipments to the 
Allies.”) (citations omitted).  Overman Report, supra note 29, at 8. 
  As part of the same effort, a German agent obtained a contract to purchase from 
an American company its entire output of phenol, a potentially toxic compound, which 
Thomas A. Edison was manufacturing.  Gompers	Confirms	Foreign	Tampering, supra note 
44; Explosive	 Acid	Deal	 Cost	Millions, WASH. POST,	Aug. 17, 1915 at 2; Agreement	 By	
Schweitzer	to	Buy	1,212,000	Pounds	of	Carbolic	Acid, WASH. POST,	Aug. 17, 1915 at 2.  The 
contract had also been predicated on the false assurance that the purchased phenol 
would be used to produce medicine, and not explosives.  Gompers	Confirms	 Foreign	
Tampering, supra note 44.  Germany similarly attempted to control the supply of 
chlorine, which was used in the war as a chemical weapon.  U.S.	 Looks	 into	 Spy	
Propaganda,	 supra note 33; Government	 Agents	 Probe	 Charge	 of	 $2,000,000‐A‐Week	
Propaganda	By	Germans, supra	note 21; Bernstorff Aug. 18 Letter, supra note 16, at 929.  
As the soon-to-be former German Military Attaché, Captain Franz von Papen, privately 
reported in a letter that was among the Archibald papers, once the true ownership of 
the Bridgeport Projectile Company and the entities purchasing phenol and chlorine 
were revealed, putative deals were cancelled, which of course reflects the importance of 
disguising Germany’s role.  Von Papen Aug. 20 Letter, supra	note 47.  
 50 Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	note 13, at 1501, Ex. 95; see	U.S.	Looks	Into	Spy	
Propaganda, supra note 33; Germans Sought	Aircraft	Control, supra	note 27, at 1, 3. 
	 51	 Idiotic	Yankees, supra note 46; Plot	to	Tie	Up	U.S.	Munition	Plants	Told	In	Alleged	
Letter	Of	Austrian	Envoy	Seized	From	Capt.	Archibald, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1915, at 2; U.S.	
Looks	Into	Spy	Propaganda,	supra note 33; Germans Sought	Aircraft	Control, supra	note 
27; Germany’s	Agents	Active	in	Promoting	Labor	Troubles	While	Arousing	Cotton	States	
To	Attack	British,	It	Is	Charged, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1915, at 1. 
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Wright representative and a “local business man.”52  Internal German 
correspondence included among the Archibald papers makes clear that 
the Germans intended to conceal their nexus to the purchase.53 
 American newspapers published numerous stories reprinting and 
analyzing the Albert papers, but the German Military Attaché provided 
the most concise and candid assessment.  Intended for receipt only by 
his wife, the Attaché’s postmortem was among the Archibald papers: 
I am enclosing you a few newspaper clippings which will 
amuse you.  They unluckily stole from the good Albert in the 
Elevated a whole thick portfolio . . . and then published the 
principal part of the contents. . . .  In it unfortunately were also 
a few very important things from my report, such as the 
buying up of liquid chlorine and something about the 
Bridgeport Projectile Company, as well as the documents 
about the buying up of phenol (out of which explosives are 
made) and the acquisition of the Wright flying machine 
patents. . . .  I always say to these idiotic Yankees that they 
should shut their mouths, and better still be full of admiration 
for all that heroism.54 
The Germans thus had several objectives:  propaganda and 
perception management; exploitation of social and economic divisions 
in American society; gaining economic control of materials critical to the 
war effort; and acquisition of American intellectual property.55   
Evaluating the truth of each allegation is beyond the scope of this 
Article, as is the question of whether Allied governments engaged in 
similar conduct to influence American participation in the war.  Rather, 
policymakers’ and the public’s perception of the range of German efforts 
that today might be considered “non-traditional” intelligence 
activities—not acts governed by the law of war or the high seas, such as 
the sinking of American vessels, and not comprising classic espionage 
with the objective of obtaining government secrets—is important to 
understanding the national security threats that the Espionage Act and 
Section 951 were designed to address.  To an American public presented 
with the Albert and Archibald papers, particularly in the context of the 
deadly U-Boat attacks on the Lusitania and Arabic in May and August 
 
	 52	 Germans Sought	Aircraft	Control, supra	note 27,	at 2 (quoting P. Reiswitz Letter to 
Dr. Heinrich Albert). 
 53 Von Papen Aug. 20 Letter, supra	note 47, at 940 (noting that the disclosure was 
“without importance” because the resolution of a patent dispute mooted the premise of 
the plan). 
 54 Letter from Franz von Papen, German Military Attaché, to Martha von Papen, his 
wife, reprinted	 in	Foreign Relations 1915 Supp., 940-41 (Dep’t of State, Office of the 
Historian, 1928)  
	 55	 Id.; Greenberg, supra note 25.	 
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1915,56 the “German government now stood convicted of a vast 
undercover campaign to suborn American opinion and influence 
American foreign policy.”57  Having obtained the Albert and Archibald 
papers, the U.S. Government “was sufficiently informed about the 
German [campaign] to leave uncertainty only about the actual extent of 
the activities.”58  
 Most of the German conduct described in Albert’s papers and other 
sources was not covered by existing criminal law or by statutes 
specifically designed to counter national security threats.59  Critically, 
this included clandestine German efforts to affect American media 
outlets, which prompted concerns that Germany could surreptitiously 
influence U.S. opinion about choosing sides in the war.  As Attorney 
General (AG) Thomas Watt Gregory acknowledged at the time, 
Germany’s efforts to disguise its hand in disseminating pro-German 
propaganda through purportedly independent media sources did not 
“justify criminal prosecution against any person named, or give the 
Department of Justice jurisdiction in the matter under any Federal 
statute.”60  Although DOJ “constantly” investigated potential neutrality 
violations, “nothing had been developed that would warrant Grand Jury 
proceedings” following the Albert affair.61   
Against this background, AG Gregory included in the Attorney 
General’s December 1916 Annual Report to Congress a proposal for 
 
 56 DOENECKE, note 16, at 70-71, 116.  
 57 LINK, supra note 16, at 556. 
 58 DOERRIES, supra note 32, at 143; see	Bielaski Senate Testimony, supra	note 13, at 
1388 (“During the war we have collected an immense amount of information.  Some of 
it has been in our files for a long time and some of it has only come to us comparatively 
recently.”). 
 59 Contemporary press reports examining German activities that could violate then-
extant federal laws cited German efforts to fraudulently procure American passports for 
German reservists and violations of requirements, enforced by the U.S. Postal Service, 
that newspapers (such as Fatherland) disclose when they have received payment for 
printing certain content.  See	May	 Involve	Embassy	Men, supra note 26, at 2.  Other 
German efforts, such as sabotage of factories and ships, could be prosecuted under 
existing statutes unrelated to national security.	 	United States v. Rintelen, 233 F. 793, 
794 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).  The Sherman Anti-Trust Act also provided a basis to prosecute 
German attempts to foment labor unrest.  Eight	Indicted	In	Teuton	Plots, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
29, 1915, at 1. 
	 60	 Propaganda	Inside	Law:	Department	of	Justice	Finds	Nothing	to	Warrant	Federal	
Action, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1915, at 7; see	also Warner, supra note 17. 
	 61	 Propaganda	Inside	Law,	supra note 60, at 7.  The American cutouts who purchased 
the Evening	 Mail on behalf of Germany were prosecuted under the October 1917 
enactment of the Trading with the Enemy Act for conspiring to defraud the United States 
Government by concealing debts they owed to Germany in association with the 
financing of the purchase.  Rumely, 293 F. at 533-34, 536.   
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“Changes in Laws Affecting Neutrality and Foreign Relations.”  In the 
introduction of his proposal, AG Gregory stated: 
From the experience of this department and of the State 
Department during the past three years in the administration 
of law in connection with the relations of this country with 
Mexico and with the problems arising out of the European 
war, it has become clear that there is urgent need of a revision 
of the statute law bearing on our international relations.   
 
Many acts committed in the U.S. in serious violation of its 
sovereignty and against the peace and safety of its citizens are 
not now punishable by any Federal criminal law; others are 
punishable only under unsatisfactory statutes passed in 
relation to conditions altogether different from those now 
prevailing.62  
The Attorney General sought to protect the United States and its 
citizens, as well as American neutrality and obligations to other 
nations.63  The proposal contained seventeen parts, the sixteenth of 
which eventually became Section 951.64In addition to the Attorney 
General’s introductory rationale for the proposals, each individual 
proposal was accompanied by a more detailed explanation of need 
 
 62 1916 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. at 12. 
	 63	 Id. at 13.   
 64 The proposal included:  (1) prohibiting interference with exports; (2) prohibiting 
sabotaging or destroying cargo ships; (3) authorizing the U.S. to detain armed vessels or 
vessels carrying war materiel and prohibiting individuals from sending out armed 
vessels; (4) authorizing inspection of vessels and prohibiting the use of U.S. ports by 
vessels involved in violations of law; (5) requiring passport applications to be made 
under oath and prohibiting the fraudulent procurement of passports; (6) prohibiting 
fraudulent use or counterfeiting of any U.S. Government seal; (7) enhancing Presidential 
authority to control the manner of wireless and cable transmissions to belligerent 
countries and ships on the high seas; (8) enhancing the prohibition against participation 
in foreign military enterprises against nations with which the U.S. is at peace; (9) 
authorizing seizure of arms and munitions at war that are being exported; (10) 
prohibiting breaches of internment of detained foreign military or naval personnel; (11) 
prohibiting falsely swearing in an affidavit with knowledge that it will be used to 
influence a foreign government in relation to disputes with the U.S. to defeat any 
measure of the U.S. in relation to such disputes; (12) prohibiting acquisition or 
communication of  information relating to the national defense obtained through U.S. 
Government employment, unlawful access, or fraud; (13) prohibiting the minting or 
printing of currency for insurgents in a foreign country with which the U.S. is at peace; 
(14) prohibiting conspiracy to injure or destroy overseas property of a foreign country 
with which the U.S. is a peace; (15) prohibiting falsely pretending to be a diplomatic, 
consular, or other official of a foreign government; (16) prohibiting aliens other than 
diplomatic or consular officers from acting in the U.S. as agents of foreign governments 
without notice to the U.S. Government; and (17) permitting the President to use military 
and naval forces to enforce U.S. neutrality and obligations under international law. 	Id.	
at 12-24. 
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except for the fourteenth, which prohibited conspiracy to injure or 
destroy overseas property of a foreign government with which the 
United States is at peace, and the sixteenth, which evolved into Section 
951.65 
As German submarine warfare against commercial vessels, 
including U.S. vessels, increased in early 1917, and with Britain’s 
February 1917 disclosure of the Zimmerman Telegram, Congress, at the 
request of President Woodrow Wilson, declared war on Germany in 
April 1917.66  
2.	Act of June 15, 1917	
In June 1917, Congress enacted what is now referred to as the 
Espionage Act to address various threats to domestic security. The Act 
of June 15, 1917 was captioned, “An Act to punish acts of interference 
with the foreign relations, the neutrality, and the foreign commerce of 
the United States, to punish espionage, and better to enforce the 
criminal laws of the United States, and for other purposes.”67  The Act 
contained thirteen titles, roughly tracking or incorporating most of the 
proposals in the 1916 Attorney General report to Congress.68  Title VIII, 
Section 3 (Disturbance of Foreign Relations) contained the precursor to 
Section 951, and provided that: 
Whoever, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or 
attaché, shall act in the United States as an agent of a foreign 
government without prior notification to the Secretary of 
 
 65 It is unclear why only these two proposals did not contain an explanation.  Even 
the twelfth proposal (a precursor to 18 U.S.C. § 793, which penalizes unauthorized 
retention or disclosure of national defense information), the need for which was 
considered self-evident, was accompanied by a statement that “[t]he necessity of 
legislation of this nature against spies is obvious.  The present statute . . . is incomplete 
and defective.” Id. at 19 (citation omitted). 
 66 Joint Resolution Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Imperial German 
Government and the Government and the People of the United States and Making 
Provision to Prosecute the Same, Ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1 (1917), available	 at 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/digitized-books/world-war-i-declarations/ww1-
gazettes/US-joint-res-declaring-war-against-Germany-2-OCR-SPLIT.pdf. 
 67 Pub. L. 65-24 [hereinafter 1917 Act]. 
 68 The titles were:  (I) Espionage; (II) Vessels in Ports of the United States; (III) 
Injuring Vessels Engaged in Foreign Commerce; (IV) Interference with Foreign 
Commerce by Violent Means; (V) Enforcement of Neutrality; (VI) Seizure of Arms and 
Other Articles Intended for Export; (VII) Certain Exports in Time of War Unlawful; (VIII) 
Disturbance of Foreign Relations; (IX) Passports; (X) Counterfeiting Government Seal; 
(XI) Search Warrants [which had been a separate part of the Attorney General’s 1916 
request]; (XII) Use of Mails; and (XIII) General Provisions. 
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State shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both.69 
According to the House Judiciary Committee, the 1917 Act was “a 
result of the recommendations of the Department of Justice and the 
State Department, and these recommendations were made as a result of 
the experiences of these departments during the past three years in the 
administration of law in connection with the relations of this country 
with Mexico and with problems arising out of the European war.”70  The 
Committee report contained no specific explanation for the inclusion of 
Title VIII, Section 3. 
A review of two House and two Senate Conference Reports, 
extensive floor debate over certain provisions in the bill, a two-day 
House Judiciary Committee Hearing, and testimony by Assistant 
Attorney General Charles Warren before the House Judiciary Committee 
reveal no substantive discussion about the precursor to Section 951.71  
Rather, Congress and the hearing witnesses were concerned principally 
about the First Amendment implications of the espionage provisions 
and prohibitions against inducing disaffection among soldiers and 
sailors, as well as food shortages and the impact and constitutionality of 
export controls.72  Thus, the only insight into the purpose of Title VIII, 
Section 3 comes from general introductory statements in the Attorney 
General’s 1916 report and the House Judiciary Committee, quoted 
above.73   
 
 69 1917 Act, Title VIII § 3.  This section was codified at Title 22, United States Code, 
Section 233 and later transferred to Title 22, United States Code, Section 601, before the 
1948 reorganization discussed herein.  See 22 U.S.C.A. § 233 Historical Notes. 
 70 H.R. REP. NO. 65-30 at 9 (Apr. 25, 1917). In its report, the Judiciary Committee 
devoted about a page to discussing the first five sections of Title I (Espionage), and 
focused specifically on the breadth of the powers it conferred upon the Executive Branch 
with respect to limiting speech and expression.  Id. at 10; see	also	Civil	Liberty	in	War	
Time,	supra	note 11, at 299–302 (discussing freedom-of-speech concerns regarding Title 
I of the 1917 Act).  The Committee then stated that the remainder of Title I was “self-
explanatory,” and that “all the remaining sections of the amended bill are drawn with 
sufficient clearness to be self-explanatory, and the committee is confident that the House 
will realize the importance of the passage of each section of the amended bill.”  H.R. REP. 
NO. 65-30 at 10.   
	 71	 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 65-69 (June 6, 1917); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 65-65 (May 29, 
1917); S. Conf. Rep. No. 65-44 (June 5, 1917); S. Conf. Rep. No. 65-37 (May 29, 1917); 55 
Cong. Rec. 776-2165 (chronicling debate over fourteen days from Apr. 18, 1917 through 
May 12, 1917); Espionage	 and	 Interference	 with	 Neutrality:	 Hearings	 Before	 the	
Committee	on	the	Judiciary, House of Representatives (Apr. 9 & 12, 1917); Hearing	and	
Testimony	of	Assistant	Attorney	General	Charles	Warren	Before	 the	Committee	on	 the	
Judiciary, House of Representatives (Apr. 10, 1917).   
	 72	 See	supra note 71. 
	 73	 See 1916 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. at 12; H.R. Rep. 65-30 at 9.   
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3. 1940 and 1948 Amendments 
In 1940, Congress amended the sentencing provision of Title VIII, 
Section 3, which had been codified at Title 22, United States Code, 
Section 233 (Disturbance of Foreign Relations), to mandate a prison 
term and raise the maximum sentence by inserting the language, “shall 
be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years and may, in 
the discretion of the court, be fined not more than $5,000.”  This change 
was part of a general increase in sentences for violations of the 1917 
Act.74  The House Judiciary Committee emphasized, without reference to 
any specific section, the importance of the “certainty of punishment” 
and a desire for “firmer administration of the criminal law, and sterner 
punishment of . . . convicted criminals.”75   
In 1948, as part of an overhaul of the United States Code, Congress 
repealed Title VIII, Section 3, which had been moved to Title 22, United 
States Code, Section 601, and re-enacted it without substantive changes 
as Title 18, United States Code, Section 951 within Chapter 45 (Foreign 
Relations).76  In effecting this change, Congress stated that “[n]o 
inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the 
chapter in Title 18 . . . in which any particular section is placed, nor by 
reason of the catchlines used in such title.”77   
4. Cold War-Era Amendments 
During the Cold War, Congress considered proposed changes to 
Section 951 to address perceived shortcomings in the statute, cover new 
threats, and to clarify the statute’s scope. 
i. 1982 Legislative Proposal 
In 1982, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and 
Terrorism held a hearing on two bills, one of which, Senate Bill 1963, 
would have substituted the Attorney General for the Secretary of State 
in Section 951, increased potential punishment for violations of the 
statute, required the Attorney General to promulgate regulations 
defining “agent of a foreign government,” and required the Attorney 
General to transmit to the Secretary of State notifications that DOJ 
received.78  Senate Bill 1963 was not enacted, but because it contained 
 
 74 Pub. L. No. 76-443.   
 75 H.R. Rep. 76-1716, at 2 (March 7, 1940). 
 76 Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62. Stat. 683 at 743, 862 (June 25, 1948).   
	 77	 Id., 62 Stat. at 862. 
	 78	 Communist	Bloc	Intelligence	Gathering	Activities	on	Capitol	Hill:	Hearing	on	S.	1959	
and	S.	1963	Before	the	Subcomm.	On	Sec.	and	Terrorism	of	the	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary, 
97th Cong., Ser. No. J-97-116 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 SJC Hearing]. 
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some provisions similar to later amendments to Section 951, 
Congressional and DOJ discussion of the proposal reflect the aims of 
those subsequent amendments. 
The subcommittee explained that requiring foreign agents to notify 
the Attorney General instead of the Secretary of State would enable 
effective enforcement of Section 951, and noted that the statute’s 
“usefulness [had] been demonstrated repeatedly in espionage 
prosecutions, where its violation is often used as a secondary offense 
and as an investigative predicate for the FBI.”79  The subcommittee did 
not discuss the scope of conduct that Section 951 covered.   
Witness testimony regarding Senate Bill 1963 focused on 
sufficiency of notice, interagency communication, and defining “agent of 
a foreign government.”80  John Martin, then the Chief of DOJ’s Internal 
Security Section,81 stated in response to questioning that DOJ would 
generally not prosecute an individual who had notified any U.S. 
Government department.82  Citing an example raised earlier in the 
hearing involving friendly law enforcement or intelligence officers 
working jointly in the U.S. with American agencies, Martin stated that 
DOJ’s “efforts are to get at those people who are dispatched and carry 
on secret and clandestine activities.  And they usually give notice to no 
one . . . for practical purposes of enforcing the statute we do not have 
any notification by hostile intelligence services who are dispatching 
agents.”83 
ii. Amendments to Section 951 
Section 951 was amended in 1983, 1984, 1986, 1993, and 1994.  
The 1983 and 1994 amendments only addressed sentencing.84  The 
1986 amendment added subsection (e), which listed the Soviet Union 
and Warsaw Pact nations in addition to Cuba.85  The 1993 amendment 
removed the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations.86   
The 1984 amendment added subsections (b), (c), and (d) and 
substituted the Attorney General for the Secretary of State as the official 
 
	 79	 Id. at 4.   
	 80	 Id. at 19, 20, 26, 34, 37.   
	 81	 Id.	 at 27.  The Internal Security Section was the forerunner of the 
Counterespionage Section, now the Counterintelligence & Export Control Section. 
	 82	 Id. 
 83 1982 SJC Hearing, supra note 78,	at 27. 
 84 Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XXXIII § 330016(1)(R) (Sept. 13, 1994); Pub. L. No. 97-
462 § 6 (Jan. 12, 1983).   
 85 Pub. L. No. 99-569, Title VII § 703 (Oct. 27, 1986).   
 86 Pub. L. No. 103-199, Title II § 202 (Dec. 17, 1993). 
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to whom a foreign agent must provide notice.87  The 1984 amendments 
were part of a much larger bill and appeared to be part of a years-long 
effort to reform federal criminal law.88   
The 1984 Congressional Reports did not discuss the amendments 
to Section 951.89  The 1983 Senate Judiciary Committee report on Senate 
Bill 1762, which was substantially the same as the 1984 amendment, 
however, noted that the State Department had never promulgated 
regulations regarding notification, and that it was awkward for the State 
Department to administer the statute while engaging in foreign 
relations.90  Regarding the new exclusions from the scope of the statute, 
the Committee stated: 
The proposed Act is not intended to cover those individuals in 
routine commercial matters but is intended to cover 
individuals who represent foreign governments in political 
activities that may or may not come within the scope of the 
Foreign Agent [sic] Registration Act.  By excluding from the 
notification requirement several classes of individuals who 
are presently covered, the proposal also limits the coverage of 
the statute by focusing only on those in whom the United 
States Government has a necessary interest.91   
This does not appear to evince an intent to limit the application of 
the statute beyond the exclusions that were added in 1984, but rather 
to explain the carve-outs.  While the statement regarding the 
commercial transaction exclusion could be read to limit the application 
of Section 951 to activities that could be considered “political” (which 
were not defined), it was more likely intended to explain why routine 
commercial matters were excluded.  The statement thus evinces an 
understanding and intent that Section 951 covers a broader scope of 
activity than FARA.  By enumerating specific exceptions to that scope, 
the amendment affirmed the otherwise broad sweep of conduct that 
Section 951 criminalizes if—and only if—undertaken on behalf of a 
foreign government.  Moreover, the other exclusions this amendment 
added carved out categories of agents for which a notification 
requirement would consume administrative resources without serving 
a useful purpose: accredited diplomatic and consular officers, officially 
 
 87 Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, Ch. XII, Part G § 1209 (Oct. 12, 1984).   
	 88	 See,	 e.g.,	Criminal	Code	Reform	Act	 of	1981, S. REP. NO. 97-307 (Dec. 22, 1981) 
(discussing S. 1630, which was not enacted); Comprehensive	Crime	Control	Act	of	1983, 
S. REP. NO. 98-225 (Sept. 14, 1983) (discussing S. 1762, which was not enacted).   
	 89	 See	generally H.R. REP. NO. 98-1159 (Oct. 10, 1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-1030 (Sept. 
17, 1984).   
 90 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 415. 
	 91	 Id.  
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and publicly acknowledged and sponsored representatives of foreign 
governments, and their non-U.S. citizen staff.  Congress thus appears to 
have added the exclusions in response to concerns about the undue 
burdens of enforcing the statute in its previous form.92 
In sum, the 1984 amendment was not accompanied by any 
statement of Congressional intent regarding the scope of the statute, 
beyond the limitations added to the face of the law.   
III. REPORTED CASES RELEVANT TO SCOPE OF CONDUCT 
As discussed below, early cases established the breadth of Section 
951 and how its focus on agency distinguishes it from core 
counterespionage statutes.  Several later cases more directly addressed 
the scope of conduct the statute can cover. 
In several cases examining Section 951, courts have declined to 
find limits on the scope of conduct that, when engaged in on behalf of a 
foreign government, can constitute “acting as an agent of a foreign 
government.”  As the Third Circuit stated in United	States	v.	Butenko,93 a 
clear case of Soviet information-gathering about U.S. Strategic Air 
Command systems, “[t]he cases assume that it means one who acts 
directly or indirectly for the benefit of a foreign government.”94  No 
reported cases have found that particular conduct could not be 
prosecuted under the statute (other than conduct excluded on the face 
of the statute), as long as the other statutory elements are met.  Most 
reported cases in which courts have found that conduct other than 
information-gathering violated the statute have involved defendants 
linked directly to foreign intelligence services, as have those reported 
cases in which DOJ charged Section 951 for non-information-gathering 
conduct, although there is no authority indicating such a connection is 
legally necessary. 
A.	Early	Cases	
Early prosecutions from the period between the two World Wars 
illustrate the breadth of conduct that Section 951 covers.  In United	
States	 v.	 Buerk,95 the trial court found that the indictment properly 
charged a defendant for not only “mak[ing] investigations and 
obtain[ing] information” to report to German officials, but also 
 
	 92	 See 1982 SJC Hearing, supra note 78,	at 4 (referencing State Department concerns 
“that, given the vast numbers of nondiplomatic individuals . . . the application and 
enforcement of the act is impractical”). 
 93 United States v. Butenko, 384 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1967). 
	 94	 Id. at 566.  
 95 United States v. Buerk, 38 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. Wis. 1941) (charging 22 U.S.C. § 233). 
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“mak[ing] representations and promises to divers and numerous 
persons, who were then and there skilled laborers, for the purpose of 
inducing said persons to leave the United States for Germany and reside 
in Germany and aid the said Government of Germany” from 1937 to 
1940.96  Recruiting a skilled labor force for a country with which the 
United States was not then at war exemplifies conduct outside 
traditional “espionage-like” techniques; that conduct was rendered 
illegal because the defendant acted on behalf of Germany.97 
Similarly, in United	States	v.	Heine,98 the Second Circuit found that 
a defendant’s gathering of unclassified information, generally from 
public sources, about production capacity, output, and locations of 
American aircraft manufacturers for transmission to Germany before 
the U.S. entry into the Second World War violated the predecessor to 
Section 951.99  The court explicitly found that the defendant did not 
violate the predecessor to Section 794, which penalizes “core” 
espionage.100  The court noted that there was nothing illegal about 
gathering or sending the information at issue in the case—the critical 
element in affirming the defendant’s conviction was that he acted “as an 
agent for the Reich.”101 
B.	United	States	v.	Duran	
United	States	v.	Duran102 provides an example of DOJ’s decision to 
charge under Section 951 a defendant who did not engage in conduct 
amounting to traditional espionage, of aggressive DOJ arguments 
regarding the purpose and scope of Section 951, and of an appellate 
court’s refusal to find limits on the statute’s application beyond its text 
based on a careful review of the statute and its history.103  In Duran, the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction under Section 951 
for his part in the Government of Venezuela’s effort to cover up the 
“Suitcase Scandal” between Venezuela and Argentina.104  As 
background, the scandal developed when a dual citizen of Venezuela 
and the United States attempted to smuggle $800,000 into Argentina, 
 
	 96	 Id.	at 410. 
	 97	 Id. 
 98 United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945). 
	 99	 Id.	815-17. 
	 100	 Id. at 817 (discussing 50 U.S.C. § 32); see 50 U.S.C.A. § 32 Historical Note; 18 U.S.C. 
§ 794. 
	 101	 Heine, 151 F.2d at 817. 
 102 United States v. Duran, 596 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2010).   
	 103	 Id.	at 1294-96.   
	 104	 Id.	at 1286.   
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was caught, and fled to the United States.105  The news media speculated 
that the cash was evidence that the Venezuelan and Argentinian 
governments had been facilitating the transfer of large sums of money 
from a state-owned Venezuelan energy monopoly to Venezuela’s 
favored candidate in the Argentinian presidential election.106  The 
defendant, who was implicated in the scandal because the suspected 
courier had listed him on a customs form, contacted Venezuela’s 
intelligence agency, the Direccíon de los Servicios de Inteligencia y 
Prevencíon (DISIP), who informed the defendant that the DISIP would 
be handling the scandal.107  The defendant and his brother, a DISIP 
agent, made a variety of efforts to secure the suspected courier’s 
cooperation in the DISIP-coordinated cover-up, including providing 
falsified documents and attempting to induce the courier to sign a power 
of attorney.108  The defendant was convicted of violating Section 951.109   
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the statute was vague.110  
The defendant also argued that the statute obliges individuals to notify 
the Attorney General only of conduct involving espionage or subversive 
activity and that only an individual engaged in espionage or subversive 
activity could have knowledge of the notification requirement.111  
Responding to similar vagueness arguments at trial, the Government 
argued that “[t]he word ‘act’ has a plain and ordinary meaning and 
requires no further definition,” citing as dictionary definitions 
“[p]erform an action,” “[b]ehave in a certain manner,” and “[d]ischarge 
one’s duties.”112   
The Government further emphasized at trial that the criminal 
conduct underlying Section 951 was not failing to register, but rather 
acting as an agent of a foreign government without notifying the 
Attorney General.113  Notably, addressing the purpose of the statute, the 
Government argued that: 
Congress had good reason for writing the statute as it did. 
Allowing individuals an unfettered right to act as agents for 
foreign governments inside the United States, without the 
knowledge of the Attorney General or his designees, would 
 
	 105	 Id.	at 1287.	
	 106	 Id.   
	 107	 Id.   
	 108	 Duran, 596 F.3d. at 1287-88.   
	 109	 Id. at 1290. 
	 110	 Id. at 1286.   
	 111	 Id. at 1291-92. 
 112 Government’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Duran, 2008 WL 
2740392, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2008).   
	 113	 Id. at 4.   
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allow the United States to become a haven for worldwide 
espionage and criminal activity, causing direct and indirect 
harm in this country. Congress	 rightly	 determined	 that	 the	
unique	freedoms	and	protections	available	on	United	States	soil	
should	not	be	used	by	foreign	states	to	advance	their	own	ends, 
and that, if a foreign state wants its agents to engage in 
activities on United States soil, United States officials are 
entitled	 to	know	about	 the	presence	of	 these	 individuals	and	
either	bar	them	or	take	precautions.114 
On appeal, the Government reiterated that of the three components 
of a Section 951 violation—acting, failing to notify, and serving a foreign 
government—”the first two are self-evident and require no 
elaboration,” and “the third is clearly comprehensible to persons of 
ordinary intelligence and, in any event, is further explicated by its 
accompanying regulation.”115  The Government further argued that, 
since 1917, Section 951 and its predecessors were “always, in pertinent 
part, directed at subversive activities in the United States other than 
espionage—that is, [Section 951’s] forebear provision was intended to, 
and has always outlawed [sic] foreign agents from seeking to interfere 
in the United States with private, non-governmental entities.”116  
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Government and, in very 
clear terms, rejected the idea that Section 951 was confined to activities 
similar to traditional espionage.117  It found that “nothing in § 951 is, in 
the context before us, vague” and that the text of the statute was “clear 
and unambiguous.”118  The court agreed that the defendant’s actions, not 
status, as an agent were subject to the statute.119   
The Eleventh Circuit further concluded that, based on the plain 
language of the statute, the legislative history, and case law, the scope of 
Section 951 was not limited to subversive activity or “espionage-
related” conduct.120  Rather, “the activities that fall within § 951’s 
purview have never been expressly or by judicial interpretation limited 
to those bearing upon national security or even those which by their 
 
	 114	 Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).   
 115 Government’s Reply Brief, United States v. Duran, 2009 WL 6338811, at *31 (Aug. 
14, 2009).   
	 116	 Id. at *33, *35-*36 (citing as evidence that Section 951 was intended to cover 
conduct “precisely” such as the defendants’ conduct the facts that other provisions of 
the 1917 Act, later codified elsewhere in Title 18, prohibit espionage, and that Section 
951 is contained within the “Foreign Relations” chapter of Title 18, not the “Espionage” 
chapter); but	see Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. at 862, discussed in Part II(B)(3), supra. 
	 117	 Duran, 596 F.3d at 1293. 
	 118	 Id. at 1291.   
	 119	 Id. at 1293 n.2. 
	 120	 Id. at 1293.   
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nature are criminal or inherently wrongful.”121  Although the court 
found that the statute was sufficiently clear on its face to render resort 
to legislative history unnecessary, the court reviewed the history of the 
1917 Act, and noted that “over time, the original 1917 Act broke off into 
three directions to form three separate registration or notification 
statutes dealing with agents of foreign governments.”122  The court then 
distinguished Section 951 from FARA and 50 U.S.C. § 851, the espionage-
specific registration requirement, and determined that Congress 
intended Section 951 to be a “catchall statute that would cover all 
conduct taken on behalf of a foreign government.”123  Accordingly, 
Section 951 “reaches beyond” both FARA and 50 U.S.C. § 851 
classifications to “any affirmative conduct undertaken as an agent of a 
foreign government.”124  Thus, the “broad sweep of § 951 creates a 
plethora of possibilities under which those engaged in purportedly legal 
conduct on behalf of a foreign government” could be subject to 
prosecution.125  In a footnote, however, the court reserved the 
possibility that government attempts to include purely innocent activity 
within the scope of Section 951 might raise constitutional concerns.126   
C.	United	States	v.	Dumeisi	
The defendant in United	 States	 v.	 Dumeisi,127 who published an 
Arabic-language newspaper in Illinois, engaged in a combination of 
information-gathering and other activity on behalf of Iraq.128  He 
volunteered to the Iraqi Mission to the United Nations (IMUN) to publish 
materials or articles it supplied, described his newspaper as “a 
newspaper for Iraq” while requesting financial support from an Iraqi 
Intelligence Service (IIS) officer, received equipment and articles from 
IMUN and IIS personnel, and provided press credentials for then-
current and former IIS officers.129  The defendant also met with 
members of the IIS, and received at least one cash payment.130  He also 
discussed monitoring activities of the Iraqi opposition in the United 
 
	 121	 Id.   
	 122	 Id. at 1294 & nn.4-5.   
	 123	 Duran, 596 F.3d at 1294-95, 1294 n.6.   
	 124	 Id.	at 1295.  
	 125	 Id. (noting the role of prosecutorial discretion).   
	 126	 Id. at 1296 n.9 (“Because Duran’s conduct was not innocent, we need not in this 
case express an opinion as to the constitutionality of possible applications of § 951 to 
completely innocent conduct.”).  
 127 United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2005). 
	 128	 Id. at 570, 581. 
	 129	 Id. at 570, 571.   
	 130	 Id. at 570-71, 581, 582.   
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States, gathered information about a prominent opposition figure for 
the IMUN, surreptitiously recorded a meeting with an opposition figure, 
and published incendiary articles to provoke Iraqi Opposition members 
in the United States into revealing themselves.131   
The court affirmed that the defendant’s gathering information for 
a foreign government violated Section 951.132  The court also listed as 
further evidence of a Section 951 violation the defendant receipt from 
the IIS payments and directions on how to use a human asset, offering 
to publish articles for the IMUN, receipt of training and tasking to report 
on opposition activities, weekly telephone conferences with the IMUN 
to receive instructions, receipt of covert recording equipment, and 
providing false press credentials to enable IMUN employees to access 
places where they could not have traveled as diplomats.133  This 
demonstrates the court’s view that any of these acts could satisfy 
Section 951.   
Notably, in later discussing Dumeisi’s conviction in testimony 
before a House Judiciary subcommittee in 2008, Patrick Rowan, then 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General of DOJ’s National Security 
Division, described the defendant as having been convicted of “violating 
[S]ection 951 for his activities spying	on	 Iraqi	dissidents in the United 
States for Saddam Hussein.”134  Mr. Rowan continued, “Dumeisi is a good 
example of how we can use 18 U.S.C. Section 951 against somebody who 
wasn’t involved in collecting classified information but was nonetheless 
working in this country on behalf of a foreign government.”135  	
D.	United	States	v.	Latchin	
In United	 States	 v.	 Latchin,136 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction under Section 951 for undertaking activities on 
behalf of the IIS, even though the court did not determine what the 
defendant actually did on the IIS’s behalf.137  The defendant had joined 
the IIS well before moving to the United States, and appeared to have 
moved to the United States without being aware that he had been 
 
	 131	 Id.	at 570, 571, 573. 
	 132	 Dumeisi	424 F.3d at 581. 
	 133	 Id. at 581.   
	 134	 Enforcement	of	Federal	Espionage	Laws: Hearing	Before	the	Subcomm.	on	Crime,	
Terrorism,	&	Homeland	 Sec.	 of	 the	H.	 Comm.	 on	 the	 Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6 (2008) 
(testimony of J. Patrick Rowan, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice) (emphasis added).   
	 135	 Id. 
 136 United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2009).   
	 137	 Id. at 715.   
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chosen to be an IIS “sleeper agent.”138  Still, he traveled to Eastern 
Europe several times to meet with an IIS handler and received payments 
from the handler.139  The court did not require evidence of espionage:  
“Whether [the defendant] actually spied . . . may be another matter 
altogether.”140  Indeed, the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction 
under Section 951 because there was sufficient circumstantial 
evidence—receiving money from IIS personnel overseas and placing 
thirty-nine telephone calls to the IIS second-in-command of the sleeper 
program—for the jury to conclude that the defendant “took acts of some	
kind on behalf of Iraq” without notifying the Attorney General.141 
IV. ADDITIONAL PROSECUTIONS UNDER SECTION 951 
A review of indictments and plea agreements in other cases in 
which DOJ charged violations of Section 951 in roughly the first ten 
years of this century reveals that most fall into one of two categories:  
information-gathering and procurement or sanctions evasion.142  In 
addition, most involve defendants who worked with foreign intelligence 
services.143 
The defendants in most cases gathered information for foreign 
governments, primarily China, Russia, Iraq, and Cuba.144  The 
defendants in several cases procured or sought to procure technology 
 
	 138	 Id. at 711.   
	 139	 Id.   
	 140	 Id. at 715.   
	 141	 Id. 
 142 Cases involving multiple defendants are referenced as a single case.  This analysis 
does not discuss certain cases under seal or for which records were not available.  	
	 143	 See	infra	notes 145, 146. 
 144 United States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bidawid, 
No. 2:07-cr-20389 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 2007), ECF No. 3, (Nov. 29, 2007), ECF No. 4 
(indictment dismissed due to defendant’s death); United States v. Chun, No. 1:16-cr-
00518 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2016), ECF No. 3, (Jan. 23, 2017), ECF No. 16; United States v. Al-
Awadi, No. 2:07-cr-20314 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2007), ECF No. 24;	 United States v. 
Alvarez, 506 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2007); United States v. Ali, No. 1:06-cr-00292	
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2011), ECF No. 204; United States v. Aquino, No. 2:05-cr-00719 (D. N.J. 
Oct. 6, 2005), ECF No. 16;	United States v. Buryakov, No. 1:15-cr-00073 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 
2015), ECF No. 10; United States v. Chapman, No. 1:10-cr-00598, (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2010), 
ECF No. 16; United States v. Chiu, No. 8:05-cr-00293, (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2007), ECF No. 
584; United States v. Chung, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2009); United States v. 
Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2005; United States v. Gari, No. 1:01-cr-00810 (S.D. Fla. 
Sept. 4, 2001), ECF No. 2; United States v. Kang, No. 1:08-cr-00210 (E.D. Va. May 28, 
2008), ECF No. 43-46; United States v. Nicholson, No. 3:09-cr-00040, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 45126 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2010), ECF No. 185, 186.  These cases are presented solely 
to demonstrate how facts were alleged to establish violations of Section 951 and/or 
conspiracy to violate Section 951.	
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for foreign governments, evaded sanctions, or both.145  Of the 
information-gathering and procurement cases, four also involved other 
activities such as perception management.146   
Recent cases often reflect contemporary analogs of the nation-state 
actions that prompted the enactment of the Espionage Act a century ago.  
Two defendants are currently charged with obtaining positions at an 
American social media company to gain inside access to customer 
information at the direction of a foreign government.147  Amin Yu, acting 
as an agent of the PRC, procured items in the United States for use in the 
PRC’s development of autonomous underwater vehicles.148  Alexander 
Fishenko used a U.S.-based company to obtain and provide to Russia $50 
million worth of microelectronics and other technology.149  Russian 
national Maria Butina agreed to act in the United States under the 
direction of a Russian government official.150  Subject to that direction, 
she “sought to establish unofficial lines of communication with 
Americans having power and influence . . . for the benefit of the Russian 
Federation.”151  Evgeny Buryakov acted as an undeclared agent of 
Russian intelligence and, in that capacity, developed a plan to exert 
pressure on a union to benefit Russia, attempted to obtain sensitive 
technical information relating to stock-trading, and conducted other 
 
	 145	 See	U.S. v. Fishenko, No. 1:12-cr-00626 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2014), ECF No. 266; Press 
Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Russian Agent Sentenced to Ten 
Years for Acting as Unregistered Russian Government Agent and Leading Scheme to 
Illegally Export Controlled Technology to Russian Military (Jul. 21, 2016) (available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-agent-sentenced-10-years-acting-
unregistered-russian-government-agent-and-leading); United States v. Huang, No. 3:06-
cr-00102, (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 2006), ECF No. 1, (Dec. 11, 2016) ECF No. 41 (guilty plea to 
18 U.S.C. § 1001);	U.S. v. Moo, No. 1:06-cr-20006 (S.D. Fla 2006), ECF No. 36, (Aug. 1, 
2006), ECF No. 122; U.S. v. Sudarshan, No. 1:07-cr-00051 (D.D.C. March 7, 2007), ECF 
No. 1 (reference made only to factual allegation in indictment); United States. v. 
Shemami, 425 Fed. Appx. 425 (2011).  These cases are presented solely to demonstrate 
how facts were alleged to establish violations of Section 951 and/or conspiracy to 
violate Section 951. 
	 146	 Campa, 529 F.3d at 1002 (“sowing disinformation” on behalf of Cuban 
intelligence); Dumeisi, 424 F.3d at 579 (publishing newspaper articles at the direction 
of Iraqi intelligence); United States v. Shaaban, 252 Fed. Appx. 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(proposal for U.S.-based TV station funded by Iraqi intelligence); Duran, 596 F.3d at 
1287-88 (influencing a witness on behalf of Venezuelan intelligence). 
	 147	 See	e.g.,	United States v. Abouammo et. al., No. 3:19-cr-00621 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 
2020), ECF No. 53.  All defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.  
This case is referenced only to illustrate the assessment that the facts alleged are 
sufficient to establish the elements of Section 951. 
 148 United States v. Yu, No. 6:16-cr-00023 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 2016), ECF No. 39. 
 149 U.S. v. Fishenko, No. 1:12-cr-00626 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2014), ECF No. 266; see 
Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, supra note 145. 
 150 U.S. v. Butina, No. 1:18-cr-00218 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2018) ECF No. 66, at 1. 
	 151	 Id.	at 2. 
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collection and influence activities.152  Jun Wei Yeo acted on behalf of PRC 
intelligence services “to spot and assess Americans with access to 
valuable non-public information.”153 These cases reflect foreign 
governments’ persistent use of “non-traditional” actors to engage in 
clandestine efforts to collect information, obtain sensitive technology, 
and exert unattributed or misattributed influence within the United 
States.  In other words, the same threats that motivated the enactment 
of the predecessor to Section 951 remain active national security 
concerns today.154 
 
 152 Press Release, Russian Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Russian 
Banker Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 30 Months in Prison For Conspiring to 
Work for Russian Intelligence, (May 25, 2016) (available at 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/russian-banker-sentenced-manhattan-
federal-court-30-months-prison-conspiring-work).	
 153 United States v. Yeo, No. 1:20-cr-00087 (D. D.C. July 24, 2020), ECF No. 9 at 1.  
 154 There have been acquittals in prosecutions under Section 951.  While juries of 
course do not provide reasons for acquittals, in one case, United	States	v.	Fondren, the 
trial judge entered an order of acquittal.  The order, however, did not address the scope 
of conduct.  The district judge granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal on one count 
of conspiracy to violate Section 951 and one count of aiding and abetting the violation 
of Section 951, but the defendant’s jury conviction of unlawful communication of 
classified information by a government employee (50 U.S.C. § 783(a)) was affirmed on 
appeal.  See	United States v. Fondren, 417 Fed. Appx. 327, 333 (4th Cir. 2011).  The 
transcript of the district court’s acquittal on the Section 951-related charges reveals that 
the decision had nothing to do with the scope of conduct the statute covers.  Rather, it 
was based on the defendant’s lack of knowledge that the individual to whom he provided 
information was an agent of a foreign government during the time covered by the two 
Section 951-related counts of the indictment.  United States v. Fondren, No. 1:09-cr-
00263, 59-60, 70 (E.D. Va. 2009), ECF No. 110.   
  In United	States	v.	Turner, DOJ charged the defendant with Section 951 and FARA 
violations based on his involvement in lobbying and public relations on behalf of a 
foreign government, but the defendant was acquitted at trial of the Section 951 count.  
United States v. Turner, No. 1:13-cr-00572-2, 2014 WL 4699708, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 2014) 
ECF No. 38, 212.  The defendant was convicted of an export control charge under IEEPA.  
Similarly, in	 United	 States	 v.	 Amirnazmi, 648 F. Supp. 2d 718 (E.D. Pa. 2009), the 
defendant was convicted at trial of a charge brought under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), apparently involving illegal exports to Iran, but was 
acquitted of violating Section 951. 
  Finally, in United	States	 v.	Rafiekian, the trial court examined not the scope of 
conduct that Section 951 could encompass, but rather the boundaries of an “agency” 
relationship that would satisfy the statute.  United States v. Rafiekian, 2019 WL 4647254 
(E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2019), at *10-12.  After a jury found the defendant guilty of violating, 
inter	 alia, Section 951, the court applied a common-law definition of agency to the 
statute and found that no rational juror could find such a relationship between the 
defendant and a foreign government.  The court further found insufficient evidence that 
the defendant operated subject to a foreign government’s “direction and control.”  Id. at 
*13-14.  Accordingly, the court granted the defendant’s motion for acquittal.  Id. at *1.  
The Government has appealed that decision.  Id., appeal	docketed, No. 19-4803 (4th Cir. 
Oct. 31, 2019); see Judges	May	 Reinstate	 Foreign	 Agent	 Case	 Against	 Flynn	 Partner, 
POLITICO, Dec. 12, 2020,	 available	 at 
AARON (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2021  5:49 PM 
2021]			18	U.S.C.	SECTION	951	AND	THE	NON‐TRADITIONAL	INTELLIGENCE	ACTOR	THREAT 31 
V. APPLICATION TO CURRENT THREATS 
As suggested in the Introduction, the United States confronts 
twenty-first century threats from Russia and the PRC, among others, 
that are analogous to the German covert activity that prompted the 
enactment of the Espionage Act, including the predecessor to Section 
951, in the first instance.  The United States Intelligence Community 
formally notified the public of its assessment that: 
 
Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election 
represent the most recent expression of Moscow’s 
longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal 
democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a 
significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope 
of effort compared to previous operations. . . . 
 
Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging 
strategy that blends covert intelligence operations—such as 
cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government 
agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and 
paid social media users or “trolls.”155 
 
Meanwhile, the United States Senate Subcommittee on 
Investigations under the committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs, issued a detailed report regarding the PRC’s use of 
programs, collectively referred to as “Talent Plans,” to obtain the benefit 
of U.S.156 research and development efforts by recruiting “researchers, 
scientists, and experts in the public and private sector to provide China 
with knowledge and intellectual capital in exchange for monetary gain 
and other benefits.”157  According to the Subcommittee findings, Talent 
Plan participants receive specific taskings from the PRC government, 
including applying knowledge gained from their U.S.-based work to 




 155 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) 2017-01D (Jan. 6, 2017) (Declassified 
Version) at ii, available	at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. 
 156 The Talent Plan programs do not exclusively target the United States, but only 
their operation in the United States is directly relevant to this Article. 
 157 U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, Perm. Subcomm. on 
Investigations, Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment 
Plans (Nov. 18, 2019) at 1 [hereinafter PSI Report], available	at	Whereas the global 
ambitions of WWI-era Imperial Germany, consistent with the era, focused on prestige 
and control of land, the PRC seeks to advance its geopolitical position through, inter	alia, 
economic, scientific, and technological superiority.  Id. at 1-2, 7.   
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participants, and sponsoring visiting students.158  To be clear, 
participation in the Talent Plans is not in and of itself illegal. Recent 
cases, however, have alleged that recruiters and participants have 
concealed the support or direction they receive from the PRC.159  The 
Senate investigation found that such deception is an intrinsic feature of 
the Talent Plan programs.160  Such concealment or deliberate failure to 
make a required disclosure may constitute precisely the type of covert 
nation-state conduct that Section 951 is designed to expose, deter, and 
punish.  As several courts have emphasized, a defendant may be 
convicted under Section 951 for undertaking an act in the United States 
at the direction or control of a foreign government even if the act itself 
is not illegal.161  Rather, concealing the foreign hand that directs and 
controls the actor constitutes the threat. 
The threats of undisclosed foreign influence in American politics 
and society and of covert foreign engagement in American economic, 
scientific, and technological activities,162  remain significant national 
security challenges.  The recent and ongoing prosecutions under Section 
951 described above, as well as the trends that DOJ, the FBI, and the 
Senate have identified as discussed above, reflect the persistent nature 
of those threats.163  Recognizing that today’s threats are on a continuum 
 
 158 PSI Report, supra note 157,  at 27-30. 
 159 United States v. Ye, No. 1:20-cr-10021 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 2020), ECF No. 1.  See	e.g., 
Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Harvard University 
Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases 
(Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-
two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related (last visited Oct. 19, 
2020).  The details contained in the charging documents are allegations.  The defendants 
are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a 
court of law.  Pending cases are referenced herein solely to illustrate the application of 
law to the facts alleged.  
 160 PSI Report, supra note 157, at 29 (“Some contract provisions reflect an intent to 
keep the [Talent Plan] members’ work in China secret.”).  A more recent report, from the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, also called for recognition of Russia’s use of 
non-traditional intelligence actors.  Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
United States Senate, on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 
2016 U.S. Election, Vol. 5:  Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities, at 933-34,  
	 161	 Latchin, 554 F.3d at 715; United States v. Ji, No. 1:18-cr-00611 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 
2020), ECF No. 90, at 2. 
 162 It bears emphasizing that foreign participation in many aspects of the American 
economy and educational system, including scientific and technological research, are 
entirely appropriate and indeed beneficial.  Concealing or failing to make required 
disclosure of foreign involvement, however, deprives stakeholders in the United States 
of the knowledge that they are dealing with foreign governments, and thus prevents 
them from factoring that involvement into their decision-making.   
 163 Foreign intelligence activities such as influence operations and theft of 
information that occur using “cyber” means have generally not been charged under 
Section 951.  Rather, such conduct is more often charged under the Computer Fraud and 
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with those that prompted the enactment of Section 951 and to which 
law enforcement has historically applied the statute is essential to 
understanding how and when the statute could be applied in the future.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The adversaries of the United States continue to deploy strategies 
and tactics that prompted the enactment of the Espionage Act, including 
the predecessor to Section 951, more than one hundred years ago.  
Those strategies include the use of undisclosed agents to conduct 
campaigns of interference in American political, social, economic, 
scientific, and technological leadership and independence.  As the 
history of Section 951 set forth above demonstrates, it is important for 
legal practitioners and those who act in the United States on behalf of 
foreign governments to understand the broad scope of conduct that the 
statute renders illegal if undertaken at the undisclosed direction of a 
foreign government, regardless of whether the actor is a classic “spy.”  
Those who conceal their taskings by foreign governments deprive the 
United States of information critical to informed decision-making, which 
in turn lies at the core of autonomy and independence.  Section 951 will 








Abuse Act and/or as Economic Espionage, Wire Fraud, or related offenses.  See	 e.g., 
“Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three Russian Companies for 
Scheme to Interfere in the United States Political System,” Feb. 16, 2018, available	at	
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/grand-jury-indicts-thirteen-russian-individuals-and-
three-russian-companies-scheme-interfere; “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers 
For Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations And A Labor Organization For 
Commercial Advantage,” May 19, 2014, available	 at https://www.justice.gov/usao-
wdpa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-
corporations-and.  Such charging decisions may obviate the need to assess whether an 
overseas cyber actor “acts in the United States” for the purpose of Section 951, given the 
ready availability of statutes that offer at least as favorable sentencing potential.  See	e.g., 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(b), 1831, 1343. 
